Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Preface
- Part I THE MAKING OF ISLAM AS A MODERN RELIGION
- Part II ISLAMISM AS THE PREEMINENT POLITICAL FORCE PRE– AND POST–ARAB SPRING
- 7 Political Opposition through Islamic Institutions
- 8 Ideological Strength of Islamist Opposition
- 9 From Martyrs to Rulers
- Part III THE DISJUNCTION OF DEMOCRACY AND SECULARISM – LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ARAB SPRING
- Appendix I Religious Violence Index
- Appendix II Egyptian Constitution, Ratified on December 26, 2012. Suspended on July 3, 2013
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
9 - From Martyrs to Rulers
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Preface
- Part I THE MAKING OF ISLAM AS A MODERN RELIGION
- Part II ISLAMISM AS THE PREEMINENT POLITICAL FORCE PRE– AND POST–ARAB SPRING
- 7 Political Opposition through Islamic Institutions
- 8 Ideological Strength of Islamist Opposition
- 9 From Martyrs to Rulers
- Part III THE DISJUNCTION OF DEMOCRACY AND SECULARISM – LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ARAB SPRING
- Appendix I Religious Violence Index
- Appendix II Egyptian Constitution, Ratified on December 26, 2012. Suspended on July 3, 2013
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
The credibility of Islamists across different social groups has been strong because they use the vocabulary and values of Islam to combat the corruption and nepotism of the state. In this sense, they reach out not only to the disenfranchised segments of Muslim countries but also to a large coalition of middle and sometimes upper classes who wish to curb the prevailing influence of the state. Two main factors bolstered the popularity of the Islamists: unfulfilled promises of education and social progress made by the Promethean authoritarian state. For this reason, Islamist opposition has gained legitimacy and credibility in three distinct ways: by being the oppressed group par excellence; by taking state prerogatives in providing social services to the whole society; and by skillfully employing different means to mobilize support for its platform.
The social services dimension has been abundantly surveyed; therefore this chapter focuses on the oppressed status of Islamists and their techniques of social mobilization. It also discusses the erosion of their popularity since the Arab Awakening.
STATE OPPRESSION OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS
Being the “oppressed” meant that Islamists did not benefit from the nepotistic practices of the regimes and therefore gained an aura of purity and honesty, not to mention martyrdom, that no other political actors could claim, at least until the Arab Spring.
In this regard, the rise to power in 2011 of political actors who spent many years in jail under Mubarak or Ben Ali was a spectacular reversal of fortune. For example, FJP vice chairman Essam al-Erian spent eight years in jail between 1981 and 2010. In Tunisia, the former prime minister, Hamadi Jebali (served December 2011–March 2013), spent a total of sixteen years in jail, ten of them in solitary confinement. Ali Larayedh, who was prime minister in 2013, spent fifteen years in prison under the Ben Ali regime. His wife was also imprisoned and sexually abused. Ennahda Chairman Rached Ghannouchi was imprisoned in 1981 and again in 1987 for a total of four years, spending another twenty-two years in exile.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Awakening of Muslim DemocracyReligion, Modernity, and the State, pp. 211 - 234Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014