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Part III - Implications

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2016

Birger Wernerfelt
Birger Wernerfelt
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
Foundations of the Resource-Based View
 , pp. 113 - 178
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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  • Implications
  • Birger Wernerfelt, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Book: Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
  • Online publication: 03 November 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316466872.009
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  • Implications
  • Birger Wernerfelt, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Book: Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
  • Online publication: 03 November 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316466872.009
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Implications
  • Birger Wernerfelt, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Book: Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
  • Online publication: 03 November 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316466872.009
Available formats
×