Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- 3 Adaptation Costs in One Dimension
- 4 Adaptation Costs in Three Dimensions
- 5 All Adaptations Are Not the Same
- 6 Resources and the Scope of the Firm
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
4 - Adaptation Costs in Three Dimensions
Firms, Markets, and Contracts
from Part II - The Main Argument
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2016
Book contents
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the Firm
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Part I Agenda
- Part II The Main Argument
- 3 Adaptation Costs in One Dimension
- 4 Adaptation Costs in Three Dimensions
- 5 All Adaptations Are Not the Same
- 6 Resources and the Scope of the Firm
- Part III Implications
- Part IV Empirical Tests
- Part V Foundations
- Part VI Postscript
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Adaptation, Specialization, and the Theory of the FirmFoundations of the Resource-Based View, pp. 58 - 82Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2016
References
Antras, Pol, and Helpman, Elhanan, “Global Sourcing,” Journal of Political Economy, 112, no. 3, 552–80, 2004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Atalay, Enghin, Hortacsu, Ali, and Syverson, Chad, “Vertical Integration and Input Flows,” American Economic Review, 104, no. 4, April, 1120–48, 2014.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bajari, Patrick, and Tadelis, Steven, “Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A theory of Procurement Contracts,” RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 387–407, 2001.Google Scholar
Baker, George P., Gibbons, Robert, and Murphy, Kevin M., “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 39–83, 2002.Google Scholar
Barzel, Yoram, “Measurement Costs and the Organization of Markets,” Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 27–48, 1982.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Board, Simon, “Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty,” American Economic Review, 101, 3349–67, 2011.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolton, Patrick, and Rajan, Ashvin, “The Employment Relation and the Theory of the Firm: Arm’s Length Contracting versus Authority,” Working Paper, Princeton University, 2001.Google Scholar
Brynjolfsson, Erik, and Hitt, Lorn M., “Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation, and Business Performance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 23–48, 2000.Google Scholar
Busse, Meghan, Silva-Risso, Jorge, and Zettelmeyer, Florian, “$1000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through of Auto Manufacturer Promotions,” American Economic Review, 96, 1253–70, 2006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calzolari, Giacomo, and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, “Relational Contracting and Competitive Screening,” Working Paper, University of Bologna, 2009.Google Scholar
Cremer, Jacques, Spiegel, Yossi, and Zheng, Charles Z., “Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition,” Economic Theory, 38, 41–72, 2009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dessein, Wouter, and Santos, Tano, “Adaptive Organizations,” Journal of Political Economy, 114, 956–95, 2006.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fehr, Ernst, Hart, Oliver D., and Zehnder, Christian, “Contracts, Reference Points, and Competition: Behavioral Consequences of the Fundamental Transformation,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 7, 561–72, 2009.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbons, Robert, Holden, Richard, and Powell, Michael, “Organization and Information: Firms’ Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127, 1813–41, 2012.Google Scholar
Grossman, Gene M., and Helpman, Elhanan, “Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 85–120, 2002.Google Scholar
Grossman, Sanford, and Hart, Oliver D., “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691–719, 1986.Google Scholar
Guasch, J., Luis, , Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right, Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2004.Google Scholar
Halac, Marina, “Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships,” American Economic Review, 102, 750–79, 2012.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, Oliver D. and Moore, John, “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119–58, 1990.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hart, Oliver D., and Moore, John, “Contracts as Reference Points,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 1–48, 2008.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Helpman, Elhanan, Melitz, Marc J., and Yeaple, Stephen R., “Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms,” American Economic Review, 94, 300–16, 2004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hortacsu, Ali, and Syverson, Chad, “Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices,” Journal of Political Economy, 115, 250–300, 2007.Google Scholar
Jackson, Matthew O., and Sonnenschein, Hugo F., “Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions,” Econometrica, 75, 241–57, 2007.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lucas, Robert E., “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” Bell Journal of Economics, 9, 508–23, 1978.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maciejovsky, Boris, and Wernerfelt, Birger, “Costs of Implementation: Bargaining Costs versus Allocative Efficiency,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 77, 318–25, 2011.Google Scholar
Macleod, W. B., and Malcomson, J. M., “Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment,” Journal of Political Economy, 96, 832–54, 1988.Google Scholar
Maskin, Eric, and Tirole, Jean, “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114, 1999.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matouschek, Niko, “Ex Post Inefficiencies in a Property Rights Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20, 125–47, 2004.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myerson, Roger B., and Satterthwaite, Mark A., “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading,” Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 265–81, 1983.Google Scholar
Rosen, Sherwin “Specialization and Human Capital,” Journal of Labor Economics, 1, 43–49, 1983.Google Scholar
Simester, Duncan I., and Knez, Mark, “Direct and Indirect Bargaining Costs and the Scope of the Firm,” Journal of Business, 72, 283–304, 2002.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Social Security Administration, U.S. Government, Online Social Security Handbook, 2009: http://socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.08/handbook-0802.html.Google Scholar
Stigler, George J., “The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market,” Journal of Political Economy, 59, 185–93, 1951.Google Scholar
Taylor, Curtis R., and Wiggins, Steven N., “Competition of Compensation: Supplier Incentives Under the American and Japanese Subcontracting Systems,” American Economic Review, 87, 598–618, 1997.Google Scholar
Wernerfelt, Birger, “Inefficient Pre-Bargaining Search,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 168, 211–23, 2012.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E., “The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations,” American Economic Review, 61, 112–23, 1971.Google Scholar
Williamson, Oliver E., Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1975.Google Scholar