WHAT TYPE OF FIRST–PERSON AUTHORITY?

Various characterizations of first-person authority have been offered in the literature. For example, it has been said that one cannot be mistaken about one's own psychological states in a way that one can be mistaken about the psychological states of others. It has been said that one's beliefs about one's own psychological states are not open to doubt, and that, in the absence of counterevidence, having a belief that one is in a given psychological state is sufficient to justify holding it. It has also been said that justified beliefs about one's own psychological states need not be based on evidence.

All of the above characterizations of first-person authority have been invoked as characterizations of something it is easy to conflate with firstperson authority. All have been invoked as characterizations of noncontingent privileged access. When I say that we have first-person authority over psychological states of a certain type what I mean is this. Necessarily, an individual who is in a state of that type has available to her a means of knowing, or justifiably believing, that she is, which is not available to anyone else. On the other hand, an individual has privileged access to a psychological state only if she is in a better position than anyone else to know, or justifiably believe, she is in it. Privileged access to a type of psychological state is non-contingent if it is a necessary truth that each one of us has it to our own states of the relevant type.