INTRODUCTION

The profile of the radical right (RR) in Europe was heightened by the election of November 20, 2001, in Denmark. The Social Democrats (SD) were voted out, and a coalition led by the Liberal Party of Denmark (LP) was voted in. As with most recent Danish governments, this was a minority government, and as the LP had declared prior to the election, it was supported by the far-right Danish People's Party (DPP). Although it was not an official part of the government, it was clear that the DPP's positions on issues such as immigration were going to have a major impact on this government's policies.

It can be argued that the cases of France, Germany, and Austria present unique types of electoral systems that have led to the specific outcomes described herein. It is not clear, then, whether the same results would hold for another case that did not have these institutional idiosyncrasies (i.e., a two-vote system in France, a 5% threshold in Germany, and the great coalition tradition in Austria). In order to determine if the model I have developed makes sense in a broader context, I have chosen Denmark as a test case. The institutional differences in Denmark are that there is a pure proportional representation (PR) system (unlike France and Germany), and the mainstream parties have alternated in power (unlike Austria); thus this case provides additional variation on both the dependent and independent variables.

The Danish party system, however, does have its own unique characteristics.