INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I analyze the role of strategic voting and strategic coordination in the vote for the radical right in France, Germany, and Austria. As described in the previous chapter, voters have varying expectations that influence their decision to vote sincerely or strategically. Those expectations are influenced by the party system and the electoral system. The model that was developed in the previous chapter guides the hypotheses for each of the cases.

France's electoral system has developed into a bipolar party system, with moderate left and right parties alternating in government. Despite the bipolar nature of the French party system, the National Front (FN) managed to gain about 15% of the vote in the first round of the 1997 legislative election, mainly at the expense of the conservative parties. Germany's and Austria's proportional representation (PR) systems have created opposite outcomes, in terms of the success of the radical right. In Germany, the radical right has not been successful in getting above the 5% electoral threshold. In Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) received 27% of the vote in the 1999 legislative election. The relative success of the radical right in France and Austria leaves no doubt that the FN and FPÖ have solid bases of support, but the FN won only one legislative seat in the 1997 election as compared with the 52 seats held by the FPÖ (out of 183). Survey data show that the radical right has similar levels of potential support in France, Germany, and Austria.