Chapter 4 argues that despite rising income, vulnerability often spurs citizens to help sustain relational clientelism.First, it examines Brazil’s substantial pro-poor income growth, fueled in large part by labor income, social pensions, and a conditional cash transfer program. Analyses show that campaign handouts become less attractive as income increases, as theory predicts.Nevertheless, many Brazilians continue to be vulnerable to adverse shocks, providing a motivation to fortify clientelist relationships as a risk-coping mechanism.State efforts to expand Brazil’s social safety net provide inadequate risk protection.Less than a tenth of Brazilians who lose their jobs receive unemployment benefits. Inadequacies in the public healthcare system often contribute to catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures. And recurring droughts threaten many citizens’ livelihood.During such shocks, Chapter 4 demonstrates why local politicians are often able to assist clients in exchange for political support – there are considerable resources and discretion at the municipal level.Overall, vulnerability provides many citizens a powerful motivation to help sustain relational clientelism.