Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
- INTRODUCTION
- PART I STRENGTHENING THE TIES: THE EFFORT AND THE PROBLEMS
- PART II FOREIGN CRISES THAT DEMONSTRATE GREAT BRITAIN'S PROBLEMS
- INTRODUCTION
- 5 Background and build-up
- 6 Involvement of Great Britain and the United States
- 7 Yalta and after
- 8 Truman: the new factor
- 9 The gathering for the San Francisco Conference
- 10 Between San Francisco and Potsdam
- 11 Concluding thoughts on the Polish crisis
- 12 Background of the crisis
- 13 1944, the critical year
- 14 The role of the press
- 15 The crisis peaks
- 16 America dives in
- CONCLUSION
- NOTES
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
- INDEX
15 - The crisis peaks
from PART II - FOREIGN CRISES THAT DEMONSTRATE GREAT BRITAIN'S PROBLEMS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
- INTRODUCTION
- PART I STRENGTHENING THE TIES: THE EFFORT AND THE PROBLEMS
- PART II FOREIGN CRISES THAT DEMONSTRATE GREAT BRITAIN'S PROBLEMS
- INTRODUCTION
- 5 Background and build-up
- 6 Involvement of Great Britain and the United States
- 7 Yalta and after
- 8 Truman: the new factor
- 9 The gathering for the San Francisco Conference
- 10 Between San Francisco and Potsdam
- 11 Concluding thoughts on the Polish crisis
- 12 Background of the crisis
- 13 1944, the critical year
- 14 The role of the press
- 15 The crisis peaks
- 16 America dives in
- CONCLUSION
- NOTES
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
- INDEX
Summary
As we have seen, America's generally neutral official stance relative to Greek affairs became irksome in some British quarters especially in late 1944 and early 1945, particularly in conjunction with continual American criticism. Although the criticism was mostly in the public prints, some of it came from other sources, sometimes from officials. In the aftermath of the April 1944 mutiny, Leeper complained of being accused by many of intervening unduly in Greek affairs and said, ‘the Americans here who refuse to accept any responsibility themselves make admirable armchair critics’. Unmoved by his envoy's discomfort, Churchill had Eden tell Leeper not to worry about appearances but to put an end to the intrigues going on in Egypt among the Greeks in exile there. Then, more significant for our study, Eden told the ambassador to keep ‘in constant touch’ with his United States and Soviet colleagues and to enlist their cooperation. ‘As you know, the President has told the Prime Minister that our policy toward Greece has his full support, and we therefore have a right to expect that the United States Ambassador should back you up in accordance with this.’
Eden probably refers to cautious remarks Roosevelt made about the mutiny and the British reaction. That these remarks, however, which simply hoped British policy would succeed, constituted ‘full support’ and implied diplomatic backstopping is surely debatable.
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Vision of Anglo-AmericaThe US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943–1946, pp. 146 - 155Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1987