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Appendix B - ‘Shavings and Sawdust’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 February 2022

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Summary

1 The trivial fact that a completely analysed proposition contains just as many names as there are things contained in its reference; this fact is an example of the all-embracing representation of the world through language.

[12.10.14]

2 The possibility of inferring completely general propositions from material propositions – the fact that the former are capable of standing in meaningful internal relations with the latter – shows that the completely general propositions are logical constructions from states of affairs.

[20.10.14]

3 Whether I assert something of a particular thing or of all the things that there are, the assertion is equally material.

[23.10.14]

4 Analogy between proposition and description: The complex which is congruent with this sign. (Exactly as in graphical representation.)

[1.11.14 (the red mark is crossed by a black question mark)]

5 The negation is a description in the same sense as the elementary proposition itself.

[12.11.14]

6 We have said: if a proposition depends only on p and it asserts p then it does not negate it, and vice versa: Is this the picture of that mutual exclusion of p and ∼p? Of the fact that ∼p is what lies outside p?

[13.6.15]

7 (This [that the simple object is prejudged in the complex] is not to be confused with the fact that the component is prejudged in the complex.)

[15.6.15]

8 For the only sign which guarantees its meaning is function and argument.

[15.4.16 -From the first record of Ms103]

9 As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally significant.

[8.10.16]

10 At any rate I can imagine carrying out the act of will for raising my arm, but that my arm does not move. (E.g., a sinew is torn.) True, but, it will be said, the sinew surely moves and that just shows that the act of will related to the sinew and not to the arm. But let us go farther and suppose that even the sinew did not move, and so on. We should then arrive at the position that the act of will does not relate to a body at all, and so that in the ordinary sense of the word there is no such thing as the act of the will.

[20.10.16]

Type
Chapter
Information
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Centenary Edition
, pp. 263 - 265
Publisher: Anthem Press
Print publication year: 2021

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