The principle of equal consideration defended in Chapter 3 is somewhat vague and abstract. It requires giving equal moral weight or importance to relevantly similar interests, no matter who has them. A critic might charge that this principle is purely formal or empty. In a sense that is right, because equal consideration by itself settles no ethical issue. A nihilist might give all relevantly similar interests the same moral weight by giving all of them none! But those who stress equal consideration in animal ethics do so with the understanding that humans (or their interests) are to be taken seriously An ethical view developed within the framework of equal consideration for animals is substantiated by an adequate ethics regarding our treatment of human beings.

Several implications of equal consideration (given plausible principles covering humans) will be fleshed out in this final chapter. But it is worth mentioning up front that most of the specified principles and other conclusions reached in this chapter do not strictly depend on (fully) equal consideration for animals. Quite a few of these conclusions flow from the uncontroversial assumption that we have a prima facie duty not to harm—combined with insights about the ways in which sentient animals can be harmed (as explored in Chapter 8) and the premise (defended in Chapter 3) that animals have moral status so that their interests matter morally.Thus, these and several other conclusions seem to depend only on giving animals serious—not necessarily equal— consideration.