Science is commonly thought to give us a factual account of reality, a true picture of the world. Yet it consists of alterable hypotheses, perpetually open to change. Unless these hypotheses are somehow, nevertheless, anchored to reality, how can science be deemed to give us true access to the world? A popular response to this problem locates the ultimate authority of science in the given, that is, in what is given with certainty to the senses, leaving all else open to variable interpretation. Yet this response is confused. Error and certainty, like truth and falsehood, are ascribable to descriptions, not, in general, to things described.

CERTAINTY AND CONSISTENCY

The so-called certainty of the given cannot protect its purported descriptions from mistake; the given cannot therefore provide a fixed control over conceptualization. If we attempt to picture all our beliefs as somehow controlled by our reports of the given, we shall have to concede that those reports are themselves not rigidly constrained by what is given in fact, since they are themselves subject to error. It does no good, then, to suppose that they constitute points of direct and self-evident contact between our belief systems and reality – firm touchstones by which all our other beliefs are to be judged, but which are themselves beyond criticism.