Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Framework for Researching Intelligence Knowledge
- 3 Intelligence in Swedish Political Culture
- 4 The Institutional Setting
- 5 The Swedish Military Intelligence Directorate
- 6 Practice for Producing Knowledge
- 7 Practice for Creating Knowledge
- 8 The Intelligence Worldview
- 9 The Representation of NATO
- 10 The Representation of Russia
- 11 The Representation of Terrorism
- 12 The Intelligence Discourse
- 13 The Intelligence ‘Style of Thought’ and ‘Collective of Thought’
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - The Representation of Russia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 April 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Framework for Researching Intelligence Knowledge
- 3 Intelligence in Swedish Political Culture
- 4 The Institutional Setting
- 5 The Swedish Military Intelligence Directorate
- 6 Practice for Producing Knowledge
- 7 Practice for Creating Knowledge
- 8 The Intelligence Worldview
- 9 The Representation of NATO
- 10 The Representation of Russia
- 11 The Representation of Terrorism
- 12 The Intelligence Discourse
- 13 The Intelligence ‘Style of Thought’ and ‘Collective of Thought’
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
CONSTRUCTING RUSSIA
This chapter investigates the MUST's representation of Russia in the estimates. During the period being investigated, this representation of Russia entailed elements of both change and continuity, although the overall construction of Russia is that of a hereditary enemy of the West and, thereby, also of Sweden. Consequently, the text regarding Russia is imbued with negative connotations. The language practice is imbued with negative qualifiers and valuations and presuppositions of Russia's motive for action.
THE REPRESENTATION OF RUSSIA
In the representation of Russia specific attributes and characteristics are ascribed to Russian politics and society. Russian politics are viewed as being largely unpredictable and the notion of unpredictability is evident throughout the representation in the estimates and considered valid for Russia, both for domestic and international politics.
A statement that refers to Russia as a political actor within the international political scene suggests that Russian foreign policy lacks a founding idea or consistent political agenda, saying it is, instead, characterised by ‘reactive ad-hoc-like actions’. ‘In essence, the pattern of Russian foreign policy was characterised by ad-hoc reactive actions. This pattern is expected to continue.’
Political unpredictability is a general attribute also ascribed to the Russian domestic political arena.
As a result of its new composition, the new Duma is expected to be more willing to cooperate than its predecessors, which increases the President's ability to implement reforms. (…) President Putin emphasises the importance of a clear and long-term strategy for Russia. This could mean a more predictable and less capricious policy.
This quotation illustrates how Russian political life is repeatedly represented in the estimates as being unpredictable. This characterisation is mainly argued by referring to the numerous reshufflings of political appointees. The assessed unpredictability in Russian politics is not referred to or argued through unpredictability in the reforms and policies adopted and implemented, instead a close relation between politicians and political outcomes seem to be the assumption underlying the conclusion of unpredictability.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Swedish Military IntelligenceProducing Knowledge, pp. 148 - 156Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2016