Since its accession to independence in 1962, the history of Burundi has been marked by cycles of essentially political violence. Adopting an empirical and largely chronological perspective, Part I of this study describes the national and international response in the aftermath of the cycles of violent conflict and human rights abuses that were committed in 1965, 1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993 and the ensuing civil war. This is done through the lens of transitional justice, defined as “the process through which States and societies deal with a legacy of large-scale human rights abuses in the context of a change of political regime”. While using the standard ideal objectives identified in much of the transitional justice literature (truth, accountability, reparation and reconciliation) for analytical purposes, Part I reconstructs the transitional justice response adopting an inductive approach (i.e. based on what has been done, if anything), leaving the normative perspective (i.e. what should be done, because of ethical or, in this case, international legal considerations) to the analysis contained in Part II. Though fully aware of the overwhelming impact of other determinants on the actual practice of transitional justice in Burundi, Part II of this study also analyses how Burundi's transitional justice process could be shaped more in accordance with its obligations under international law, most notably international human rights and humanitarian law. We suggest the combination of international standards and a domestic mechanism. More specifically, in light of the constitutional and institutional context that prevails in Burundi, this study proposes – but at the same time also critically evaluates – the use of constitutional adjudication as a way of incorporating the transitional justice process in a wider effort of promoting the rule of law in Burundi.

Methodologically, we conclude that understanding (and, a fortiori, enhancing) the effectiveness of (human rights and humanitarian) law as a source of transitional justice in a given society requires a ‘thick’ appraisal of the use of law and of the concept of the State (the main institution that produces and enforces legal norms that pertain to transitional justice). This conclusion applies to Burundi but, most probably, also to other situations where a transitional justice process occurs at a time of radical reconfiguration of the relationship between law, politics and the State, most notably after extended periods of armed conflict or authoritarianism.