Independence and Accountability in Japan and Italy

This chapter explores the role and rule of law by telling a tale of two Systems for prosecuting corruption. In Japan, prosecutors have “limited independence” from outside political influence. In Italy, prosecutors are largely insulated from the world of electoral politics. This difference makes for a huge difference in the nature and scope of corruption prosecutions.

For example, Japan's Recruit Scandal of the late 1980s “came to symbolize an entire political establishment on the take” (Schlesinger 1997: 236). Prosecutors connected more than forty politicians to dubious Recruit payoffs, including nearly every ranking member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Yet only two Diet politicians were indicted, neither of whom was prominent. In the 1990s, Italy's “Clean Hands” (Mani Pulite) investigation in the Tangentopoli (“Bribe City”) Scandal also implicated a whole political class, but with radically different results. In all, some 3,000 arrest warrants were issued, and at least 251 members of parliament and five former prime ministers were indicted (Nelken 1996). Ultimately, a small group of Italian prosecutors destroyed or caused the reconstitution of all the major parties of government (Burnett and Mantovani 1998: 6). These two scandals – Recruit and Tangentopoli – arose from similar forms of misconduct – bribery, extortion, and “political financing” – in similarly corrupt societies (Reed et al. 1996; Transparency International 1999). Whether measured by the size of the catch or the consequences of the investigation, however, they had radically different trajectories. This chapter explains why.