Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction: ‘The Spanish problem’
- 1 ‘The best that could be done at the time…’: Non-Intervention, 17 July–28 October 1936
- 2 Breaking with Non-Intervention: October 1936–October 1937
- 3 The failure of the left: October 1937–April 1939
- 4 ‘A demonstration of solidarity and sympathy…': The Spanish Workers' Fund and its competitors
- 5 Opposition: Catholic workers and the Spanish Civil War
- 6 Rank-and-file initiatives
- Aftermath and conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - ‘The best that could be done at the time…’: Non-Intervention, 17 July–28 October 1936
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction: ‘The Spanish problem’
- 1 ‘The best that could be done at the time…’: Non-Intervention, 17 July–28 October 1936
- 2 Breaking with Non-Intervention: October 1936–October 1937
- 3 The failure of the left: October 1937–April 1939
- 4 ‘A demonstration of solidarity and sympathy…': The Spanish Workers' Fund and its competitors
- 5 Opposition: Catholic workers and the Spanish Civil War
- 6 Rank-and-file initiatives
- Aftermath and conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As soon as Spain had erupted into civil war both sides turned immediately to their presumed allies for assistance and found them initially receptive. Léon Blum's newly elected Front Populaire government in France sanctioned the delivery of arms to its Spanish counterpart and the Radical Air Minister Pierre Cot prepared a consignment of aircraft. However, almost immediately Blum's resolve was shaken by a combination of factors. On 23 July he had visited the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden who cautioned him as to the wisdom of sending arms. By the time he returned news of his intentions had been leaked to the right-wing press and some of his Radical ministers were in revolt. Worried that France might be forced to stand alone against Germany at a moment of internal chaos Blum agreed to an arms embargo on 25 July. Whatever the full extent of British pressure on Blum, a matter for interminable debate amongst historians, it is clear that such a move chimed with the wishes of Baldwin's government. Already ill-disposed towards the Spanish Popular Front on ideological grounds, for the duration of the conflict the British government would believe that Britain's best interests lay in preventing Spain's civil war from becoming a general European conflict, and staying on friendly terms with the eventual victors, rather than defending Spanish democracy.
However, an embargo was difficult to explain to the rank and file of the Front Populaire, particularly as it became apparent that the rebels were continuing to receive foreign assistance.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement , pp. 37 - 72Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991
- 1
- Cited by