The rise of the Arakan Army (AA) and its civil arm, the United League of Arakan (ULA), has been a significant development within the ecosphere of ethnic armed organizations (EAO) in Myanmar over the last decade. Five years of violent confrontations with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's army, from 2015 to 2020 brought about a radical change in the distribution of power in Rakhine State. In November 2020, an informal ceasefire gave way to a year of relative calm, which the AA/ULA used to solidify its rule. Tensions rose again in late 2021 and led to a resumption of the conflict in 2022. Another informal ceasefire concluded in November 2022 was immediately described as “hanging by a thread”.

During the hot phase of the conflict with the Tatmadaw (2018–20), the AA had been designated a “terrorist” organization by the army (2017) and the NLDled government (2019).3 But the military coup of 1 February 2021 upturned the status of the AA as an opposing party. Both the junta's State Administration Council (SAC) and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a group of newly elected NLD parliamentarians, promptly retracted the terrorist appellation, hoping for neutrality from the AA or even its help. But the SAC failed to undermine the group's popular support or lure Rakhine nationalists towards a political compromise with the military. The AA chose rather to support anti-junta forces.

Even before Myanmar was torn apart by the coup in 2021, Rakhine State had been afflicted by chronic insecurity, tens of thousands of internally displaced people (IDP) faced harsh livelihood conditions, and there were towering questions about the place of its marginalized Muslims who also call Rakhine State their home. While the AA/ULA does not always appear as a protagonist, it is nonetheless entangled in concerns that are wider than simply the domestic context, including border complications with Bangladesh, the pressing issue of Rohingya repatriation, China's strong economic presence, and India's geopolitical assertiveness. Its achievements in the field and unfailing recruitment have empowered the AA, but its self-ascribed identity as a defender of the Rakhine people is tested by these domestic and transregional challenges.