France was the exception, at least initially, to the world-wide fashion of privatization. It experimented with Keynesianism in 1981, just as its partners were abandoning the approach, and extended the state rather than retracted it. Nevertheless, after two short years of Socialist government, France too joined the privatization bandwagon. Both the Socialist and Conservative governments initiated privatization reforms, but they did so for different reasons. Briefly, we argue that the Socialist privatizations, essentially aimed at deregulating the economy, were pragmatic, motivated largely by the failures of the early nationalizations and Keynesian reflation to spur the French economy, while the Conservative privatizations – primarily, state asset sales – were tactical – aimed at providing voters with a political program distinguishable from the Socialists in the legislative elections of March 1986. Ultimately, privatization allowed the Conservative parties both to win the election and to reward their allies and friends with underpriced assets. The privatization program was put on hold when Mitterrand won reelection in 1988 by reaffirming that France would neither nationalize nor privatize more firms in the runup to increased European integration in 1992. When the Conservatives returned to power in 1993, they once again advocated the sale of nationalized industries, but their privatizations took on a more pragmatic coloration, as they used the proceeds of asset sales to finance employment programs. However, by the time the new Conservative presidency of Jacques Chirac got underway after the spring of 1995, privatization once again took on a tactical twist. This time, a backlash ensued. The backlash made itself felt in the early legislative elections of 1997.