In the previous chapter we saw how Beckett moves increasingly away from an aesthetic of relation, an aesthetic of allusion, towards an aesthetic of nonrelation, and how his use of the image develops throughout this process. In this chapter, we will begin to consider one of the perceived problems involved in this shift with regard to the question of how Beckett's literary works interact with philosophical texts. That is, if Beckett moves away from allusion, from a direct link to philosophical arguments, how might his works be considered to still be involved with philosphical ideas? My contention is that Beckett's works continue to interact in important ways with works of philosophy. Further, I argue that, once the relations made explicit through the use of allusion are disavowed or rendered problematic, the use of the image becomes one of the principal strategies Beckett's works develop in maintaining the vibrant exchange with philosophy.

In The Philosophical Imaginary Michèle Le Doeuff describes the importance of images to the affects produced by philosophy. While philosophy sets out to distance itself from ‘myth, fable, the poetic, the domain of the image’, it never succeeds in developing a language which is free from images. On the contrary, ‘Imagery and knowledge form, dialectically, a common system. Between these two terms there is a play of feedbacks.’ That is, images, and the particular qualities they bring with them, serve an invaluable function within philosophical thought.