No examination of the rule of law in Afghanistan can overlook the fact that the country's largest, most mature industry is illegal. The unprecedented surge in opium price and production following the Taliban poppy ban of 2000–01 has exacerbated corruption at every level of government, as well as partly funding the neo-Taliban insurgency. This chapter explores the alternatives for Western governments' response to the Afghan opium economy, taking into account certain under-emphasised trends and the linked but not fully compatible priorities of counter-insurgency, counter-narcotics and strengthening the rule of law.

The Afghan drug economy: two key trends

Policymakers examining opium in Afghanistan are blessed with an abundance of quantitative and analytical studies, based on extensive field research by UN agencies and independent researchers. Yet many policy briefs and media reports overlook key lessons from this body of work, and orient themselves instead around sensational but misleading narratives.

For example, the Taliban are still widely described as the dominant actors in the traffic, with opium called ‘the economic engine for the insurgency’ (Filkins 2009). Also, many analyses of poppy and alternative livelihoods presuppose opium's overwhelming economic superiority, citing a farm gate price that is unbeatable by anything save (perhaps) a few high-value, exotic crops.