INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to clarify the language of rights from the point of view of a more discursive approach to metaethics. In other words, the emphasis will be on the major questions regarding definition and justification mentioned in an introductory way in the first half of the last chapter. I begin by examining some terms which are widely regarded as being practically synonymous with rights – ‘claim’, ‘entitlement‘, power’ and ‘liberty’. These terms should lead to a preliminary grasp of the defining characteristics of all rights, legal or moral, human or special, and so on. The focus is relatively wide or general.

From this general level I proceed to elucidate the language of rights at a more specialised level – that at which mostly legal philosophers and some moral philosophers discuss the terms just listed above. Thus, I devote some space to the work of Wesley Hohfeld, whose distinctions concerning the language of rights in the law have developed, according to some, a paradigmatic or classic status. Hohfeld's analysis is then adapted to fit the moral field through the interpretation of Carl Wellman. At this stage it should have become clear that clarity in elucidating rights-language does not automatically do away with controversy. Indeed it will be seen how debate on this subject involves differences of opinion at the metaethical, as well as at the normative, level. Or, to put it another way, there is disagreement not merely regarding the answer to the question what rights people have (a typically normative issue), but also regarding the proper analysis of the concept of ‘right’ (a typically metaethical issue).