In choosing the “lesser evil,” those in power had created an exceedingly difficult situation for themselves. Clearly, a new, independent organization would be a “foreign body” whose existence would be irreconcilable with the system's fundamental principles. Above all, it would challenge the omnipotence of the communist party, which, in Poland's case, had already been forced to accept the autonomy of the Catholic Church. The government's strategy regarding Solidarity and the other organizations that were forming under the union's protective umbrella did not leave much room to maneuver. If the system was not going to disintegrate, the union needed to be absorbed by the existing structures and subjugate itself to the “leading power,” as the communist party declared in the state constitution. Various tactics could be employed to achieve this: the movement's development could be hampered, its collapse could be brought about from within, or it could be discredited. A frontal attack could also be launched by using force, and above all by isolating (read: arresting) the most active members of the union and opposition. These measures—weaken and attack—were essentially complementary, since achieving the first aim would make it easier to employ the second. Taken together, they offered a chance to make Solidarity “fit” into the system in terms of its form and personnel. Or, they would make it possible to eliminate Solidarity entirely. Since the government abandoned the use of force in July and August, however, they could not resort to it now, after they had just signed the agreements, which the overwhelming majority of both Poles and foreign observers had applauded enthusiastically.

The communist party leadership also had internal issues it needed to address. To this end, Edward Gierek was removed as first secretary on September 5, a continuation of personnel changes that had begun two weeks earlier. Gierek's successor, Stanisław Kania, was an experienced, albeit colorless, apparatchik, who for many years had been responsible for party control over the security apparatus and policy toward the opposition. Soon, further changes were made in the party and government apparatus which were intended to show that the party was removing those responsible for the economic disaster. These changes did not result in complete unanimity within the ruling clique, however.