Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-m8s7h Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T15:18:02.799Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Second-best public pricing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2011

Get access

Summary

Introduction

Pricing by a public enterprise is labeled “second-best” when the enterprise must depart from ideal marginal cost prices for some accepted reason, such as to avoid too great a financial loss, and does so in a way that minimizes the consequent loss in economic welfare. The traditional “natural monopoly” faced precisely this problem. Since further economies of scale could be realized even after all demand was met, marginal cost would lie below average cost, and pricing at marginal cost would result in a deficit. For two main reasons such a deficit might be regarded as unacceptable even in a welfare-maximizing public enterprise. If price is set at marginal cost and general tax revenue is used to meet the resulting deficit, some nonusers may be forced to contribute to the cost of the service, and that seems unfair. In addition, a general tax probably will introduce price distortions elsewhere in the economy, since only a lump-sum tax would not move prices away from marginal cost levels, and a perfect lump-sum tax is infeasible. So pricing above marginal cost may be proposed for the public enterprise as an alternative way to avoid the deficit.

If more than one good or service is produced by the public enterprise, the question then arises, How are departures from marginal cost prices to be made? Second-best pricing provides one answer, for it defines the most efficient prices that are possible given any specific constraint that must be satisfied, such as a budget constraint requiring total revenue to equal total cost.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×