Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection
- 1 Preferential Trading Agreements: Friend or Foe?
- The “Legalization” of GATT Article XXIV – Can Foes Become Friends?
- 2 Third-Country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements
- 3 Contingent Protection Rules in Regional Trade Agreements
- 3.1 Commentary on “Contingent Protection Rules in Regional Trade Agreements”
- 4 The Limits of PTAs
- 5 EU and U.S. Preferential Trade Agreements: Deepening or Widening of WTO Commitments
- Straightening the Spaghetti Bowl
- 5.1 Comments on “Beyond the WTO? Coverage and Legal Inflation in EU and U.S. Preferential Trade Agreements”
- 6 Labor Clauses in EU Preferential Trade Agreements – An Analysis of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement
- 7 Do PTAs Actually Increase Parties' Services Trade?
- 8 A Model Article XXIV: Are There Realistic Possibilities to Improve It?
- 8.1 Comments on “A Model Article XXIV: Are There Realistic Possibilities to Improve It?”
- Index
Straightening the Spaghetti Bowl
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection
- 1 Preferential Trading Agreements: Friend or Foe?
- The “Legalization” of GATT Article XXIV – Can Foes Become Friends?
- 2 Third-Country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements
- 3 Contingent Protection Rules in Regional Trade Agreements
- 3.1 Commentary on “Contingent Protection Rules in Regional Trade Agreements”
- 4 The Limits of PTAs
- 5 EU and U.S. Preferential Trade Agreements: Deepening or Widening of WTO Commitments
- Straightening the Spaghetti Bowl
- 5.1 Comments on “Beyond the WTO? Coverage and Legal Inflation in EU and U.S. Preferential Trade Agreements”
- 6 Labor Clauses in EU Preferential Trade Agreements – An Analysis of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement
- 7 Do PTAs Actually Increase Parties' Services Trade?
- 8 A Model Article XXIV: Are There Realistic Possibilities to Improve It?
- 8.1 Comments on “A Model Article XXIV: Are There Realistic Possibilities to Improve It?”
- Index
Summary
There are numerous reasons of economics, trade policy, and international relations why global/multilateral trade rules may be preferable to bilateral or plurilateral trade rules. As Jagdish Bhagwati points out, the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs), regional trade agreements (RTAs), and preferential trade agreements (which encompasses all of them) has created a “spaghetti bowl.” In part, this is because none of those agreements (even “template” agreements signed by a large economy with numerous small economies) line up perfectly with each other. These dissimilarities seem inevitable, as each agreement represents a different set of negotiating priorities, at a different point in time, by different negotiators (it is human nature to be unable to resist tinkering with a previous negotiator's text!). As a result, these agreements create different tariff levels among different countries with different rules of origin, different phase-in periods, different marking rules, and so on. Not to mention different systems of investment protection, intellectual property protection, labor and human rights and environment provisions, and so on. Each of these differences may all have understandable bases, and even laudable ones, but the result is a system of such complexity that perhaps as much as 50 percent of all trade supposedly “freed” by these agreements ignores the benefits in favor of the certainty of MFN – usually WTO – tariffs.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Preferential Trade AgreementsA Law and Economics Analysis, pp. 173 - 174Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011