Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-788cddb947-pt5lt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-10-16T07:41:18.109Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8.1 - Comments on “A Model Article XXIV: Are There Realistic Possibilities to Improve It?”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2011

Kyle W. Bagwell
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Petros C. Mavroidis
Affiliation:
Columbia University School of Law
Get access

Summary

Professor Davey has written a very interesting chapter on preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Such trade preferences are, by definition, restricted to members of the PTA, but not extended to other members. As such, prima facie, they violate the cardinal principle of nondiscrimination among members of GATT/WTO as enshrined in the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause of Article I.1 of the GATT agreement of 1947 (hereafter GATT, 1947). This agreement was incorporated (with subsequent amendments) as GATT (1994) as part of the multilateral agreements signed in 1994 that concluded the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations, among which the agreement to found the WTO with effect from January 1, 1995, with the then set of contracting parties (CPs) of GATT as founder members, was one. However, the original CPs of GATT had explicitly exempted from the MFN clause, albeit under certain conditions specified in Article XXIV, namely customs unions (CUs) and free trade areas (FTAs). They also grandfathered and capped the then existing trade preferences (such as those of the UK, France, the United States, and a few other CPs) through Articles I.2–I.4. While recognizing “the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the parties to such agreements,” they also recognized that “the purpose of customs union or a free trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other members with such territories” (Article XXIV:4).

Type
Chapter
Information
Preferential Trade Agreements
A Law and Economics Analysis
, pp. 262 - 268
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adams, Richard, Dee, Phillipa, Goli, Jyothi, and McGuire, Greg, 2003. “The Trade and Investment Effects of Preferential Trading Arrangement – Old and New Evidence,” Staff Working Paper. Canberra: Australia Productivity Commission.Google Scholar
Davey, William, 2008. A Model Article XXIV: Are There Realistic Possibilities to Improve It?University of Illinois College of Law.Google Scholar
Rosa, Dean A., 2007. “The Trade Effects of Preferential Arrangements: New Evidence from the Australia Productivity Commission,” Working Paper Series No. WP 07–1. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Jackson, John, 1989. Restructuring the GATT System. London: Pinter.Google Scholar
Srinivasan, T. N., 1998. “Regionalism and the WTO: Is Non-Discrimination Passé?,” in Krueger, Anne (ed.), 1998, The WTO as an International Organization, (chapter 12). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 329–52.Google Scholar
Srinivasan, T. N., 1988. Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: From the GATT to the Uruguay Round and the FutureBoulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Wilcox, Clair, 1949. A Charter for World Trade. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
,WTO, 2007. Annual Report. Geneva: World Trade Organization. Accessed at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep07_e.pdf. Pg. 52.Google Scholar
,WTO, 1994. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts. Geneva: World Trade Organization.Google Scholar
,WTO, 1995. Regionalism in the World Trading System. Geneva: World Trade Organization.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×