It is a measure of the great significance attached to the experience of the power-sharing Executive (and the closely-related Sunningdale agreement) of autumn 1973 to spring 1974, that this short period has loomed so large in the published memoirs of many of the core protagonists. There are at least two important reasons for the concentration upon this era: first, for many of the Northern Irish politicians involved, this was their last (and sometimes only) experience of holding ministerial office, and therefore the failure of the short-lived Executive affected them deeply, in terms of their personal political lives; second, and perhaps of broader societal significance, after the collapse of Sunningdale, and the restoration of direct rule from Westminster, it took the best part of quarter of a century for British, Irish and Northern Irish policy-makers to re-engineer the conditions for a renewal of power-sharing devolved government in the guise of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Many of the memoirists analysed here share a lasting sense of regret at the failure of the experiment, and if it is considered that approximately 2,500 deaths attributable to the political violence occurred between the end of May 1974 and the 1998 Agreement, then it is not too difficult to imagine the extent of this remorse. However, if there is deep-rooted frustration articulated in these memoirs, it is also the case that there are diverse explanations for the demise of power-sharing, and the lessons that ought to have been drawn. The intention in this case study is to compare the reflections of some of the unionist and nationalist political figures who were direct actors in this drama, either as ministers in the devolved administration (Brian Faulkner, Paddy Devlin, Basil McIvor, Austin Currie), as civil servants who worked for the administration (Kenneth Bloomfield, Maurice Hayes, Robert Ramsay), or as British ministers who were engaged with the Northern Ireland government (William Whitelaw, Merlyn Rees). On occasion, the reflections of other interested parties may form a counterpoint for the analysis. The political and personal relationships that evolved during this experience, and the level of trust (or continuing distrust) that characterised these interactions, are critical factors in any explanation of the failure of power-sharing at this juncture.