Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-pfhbr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-13T00:29:28.834Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The Case for Constitutional Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2009

Paul R. Verkuil
Affiliation:
Cardozo School of Law, New York
Get access

Summary

The buck stops here.

– Harry S Truman

Our structural Constitution is all about governance or, more precisely, democratic governance, as Justice Breyer has recently reminded us. This insight vindicates the “We the People” view of sovereignty. The People, by delegating her sovereign powers to the political branches, expects democratic governance. The Constitution was designed to provide it. And chief executives like the redoubtable Harry Truman understood how to implement it.

Separation of powers helps to ensure democratic governance by assigning duties to separate political branches, and by preventing those branches from transferring or reassigning those duties. Much of the duty to govern is assigned to the Executive under Article II. The Executive power and the Commander-in-Chief power ensure that the military remains subject to civilian control. Other clauses ensure executive control of the administration. The president does not act alone, of course; he works through a network of constitutionally defined deputies.

These officials, designated “Officers of the United States” under Article II, conduct all significant public duties not performed directly by the president. Presidential control of these officers is ensured through the ability to require “the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.” And the president's duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” is a constitutional obligation. Like the oath itself, it is a promise to Congress and the people that the laws (including the Constitution) will be defended and enforced. The president is the Constitution's most duty-bound actor.

Type
Chapter
Information
Outsourcing Sovereignty
Why Privatization of Government Functions Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do about It
, pp. 102 - 120
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×