Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Our Knowledge of the Past
- Introduction: The Philosophy of Historiography
- 1 Consensus and Historiographic Knowledge
- 2 The History of Knowledge of History
- 3 The Theory of Scientific Historiography
- 4 Historiographic Opinion
- 5 Historiographic Explanation
- 6 The Limits of Historiographic Knowledge
- 7 Conclusion: Historiography and History
- References
- Notes
- Index
1 - Consensus and Historiographic Knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Our Knowledge of the Past
- Introduction: The Philosophy of Historiography
- 1 Consensus and Historiographic Knowledge
- 2 The History of Knowledge of History
- 3 The Theory of Scientific Historiography
- 4 Historiographic Opinion
- 5 Historiographic Explanation
- 6 The Limits of Historiographic Knowledge
- 7 Conclusion: Historiography and History
- References
- Notes
- Index
Summary
KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORY VS. SKEPTICISM AND ESOTERICISM
In the Meno Plato (1981) asks what virtue is and whether it can be taught. Plato's Socrates concludes that virtue is knowledge, but this knowledge cannot be taught because the people who obviously possess it have not been able to pass it on to their children and pupils. This book asks similar questions: What is knowledge of history? Who possesses such knowledge? Can this knowledge be taught? “The best proof that history is and must be a science is that it needs techniques and methods, and that it can be taught” (Le Goff, 1992, p. 179). I start in the middle, by asking who is likely to possess knowledge of history. If it is possible to identify a group of people who are likely to possess knowledge of history, the examination of the practices of this group in chapter two should provide an empirical basis for learning what is historiographic knowledge in chapter three, how it is obtained and what is its theoretical and methodological core. I argue in this chapter that consensus on historiographic beliefs in uncoerced, heterogeneous, and sufficiently large groups of historians is indicative of knowledge of history. First, I distinguish my concept of consensus from others that have no epistemic significance. Second, I explain why the unique heterogeneity of the group that reaches a consensus on beliefs favors knowledge as the best among competing explanation of the consensus.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Our Knowledge of the PastA Philosophy of Historiography, pp. 23 - 45Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004
- 2
- Cited by