Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Introducing Substance Concepts
- Chapter 2 Substances: The Ontology
- Chapter 3 Classifying, Identifying, and the Function of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 4 The Nature of Abilities: How Is Extension Determined?
- Chapter 5 More Mama, More Milk and More Mouse: The Structure and Development of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 6 Substance Concepts Through Language: Knowing the Meanings of Words
- Chapter 7 How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Epistemology for Empirical Concepts
- Chapter 8 Content and Vehicle in Perception
- Chapter 9 Sames Versus Sameness in Conceptual Contents and Vehicles
- Chapter 10 Grasping Sameness
- Chapter 11 In Search of Strawsonian Modes of Presentation
- Chapter 12 Rejecting Identity Judgments and Fregean Modes
- Chapter 13 Knowing What I'm Thinking Of
- Chapter 14 How Extensions of New Substance Concepts are Fixed: How Substance Concepts Acquire Intentionality
- Chapter 15 Cognitive Luck: Substance Concepts in an Evolutionary Frame
- Appendix A Contrast with Evans on Information-Based Thoughts
- Appendix B What Has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?
- References
- Index
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Introducing Substance Concepts
- Chapter 2 Substances: The Ontology
- Chapter 3 Classifying, Identifying, and the Function of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 4 The Nature of Abilities: How Is Extension Determined?
- Chapter 5 More Mama, More Milk and More Mouse: The Structure and Development of Substance Concepts
- Chapter 6 Substance Concepts Through Language: Knowing the Meanings of Words
- Chapter 7 How We Make Our Ideas Clear: Epistemology for Empirical Concepts
- Chapter 8 Content and Vehicle in Perception
- Chapter 9 Sames Versus Sameness in Conceptual Contents and Vehicles
- Chapter 10 Grasping Sameness
- Chapter 11 In Search of Strawsonian Modes of Presentation
- Chapter 12 Rejecting Identity Judgments and Fregean Modes
- Chapter 13 Knowing What I'm Thinking Of
- Chapter 14 How Extensions of New Substance Concepts are Fixed: How Substance Concepts Acquire Intentionality
- Chapter 15 Cognitive Luck: Substance Concepts in an Evolutionary Frame
- Appendix A Contrast with Evans on Information-Based Thoughts
- Appendix B What Has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?
- References
- Index
Summary
When my mother was three, her father came home one evening without his beard and she insisted he was Uncle Albert, my grandfather's younger and beardless brother. She thought he was, as usual, being a terrible tease, and she cried when he didn't admit his real identity. Only when he pulled out her daddy's silver pocket watch with its distinctive and beloved pop-up cover was she willing to be corrected. But just who was it that she had been thinking was being so mean, this man (her daddy) or Uncle Albert? This is what I mean by a confused idea.
I have an old letter from Yale's alumni association inquiring whether I, Mrs. Donald P. Shankweiler, knew of the whereabouts of their “alumnus” Ruth Garrett Millikan. This seemed a sensible question, I suppose, as according to their records we lived at the same address. Since I lived with myself, perhaps I knew where I was? By not owning up I evaded solicitations from Yale's alumni fund for a good many years.
More often, confusions about the identities of things are disruptive rather than amusing. It is fortunate that we generally manage recognition tasks so well, and our ability to do so deserves careful study. I will argue in this book that the most central job of cognition is the exceedingly difficult task of reidentifying individuals, properties, kinds, and so forth, through diverse media and under diverse conditions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- On Clear and Confused IdeasAn Essay about Substance Concepts, pp. xi - xivPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2000