In this final chapter, we shall ponder in greater depth how some of the principal dimensions of objectivity bear on the rule of law and the Rule of Law. Many of the connections between objectivity and law (law in general or liberal-democratic law specifically) are already apparent from the foregoing two chapters, and are therefore not in need of further exposition here. For example, we have already explored at length the crucial role of objectivity-qua-impartiality in fostering congruity between the law on the books and the law in practice within any particular jurisdiction. Some other aspects of the relationships between objectivity and the rule of law or the Rule of Law, however, stand in need of additional investigation. The analyses presented heretofore in this book will provide the requisite framework for this closing chapter's reflections.

Preliminary Remarks on the Matter of Observational Mind-Independence

As has been argued in my opening chapter, the observational mind-independence of legal norms is always strong rather than merely weak. That is, the nature of every legal norm in any legal system does not depend on what any observers (such as the system's officials) individually or collectively take that nature to be. As has also been contended, strong observational mind-independence is a nonscalar property; it applies in an all-or-nothing fashion rather than to varying degrees. Although strength and weakness are usually scalar properties, the terms “strong” and “weak” in this context are used in the technical senses specified in Section 1.2.1.