Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Norms in human development: introduction
- Part I Norms and development in epistemology
- 2 The implicit normativity of developmental psychology
- 3 Developmental normativity and normative development
- 4 Genetic epistemology: naturalistic epistemology vs normative epistemology
- 5 Norms and normative facts in human development
- Part II Norms in moral and social development
- Part III Norms in cognitive development
- References
- Index
2 - The implicit normativity of developmental psychology
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Norms in human development: introduction
- Part I Norms and development in epistemology
- 2 The implicit normativity of developmental psychology
- 3 Developmental normativity and normative development
- 4 Genetic epistemology: naturalistic epistemology vs normative epistemology
- 5 Norms and normative facts in human development
- Part II Norms in moral and social development
- Part III Norms in cognitive development
- References
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Any developmental psychology is necessarily normative, because it deals, in one way or another, with perfection and perfectibility. The importance of this principle has been lost in the default position taken in developmental psychology in the twentieth century.
Development as mere passage of time
In the most objectivistic and empiricistic view of development, development is merely the measure of change over time. But even in such a simplistic conception of development, not any change qualifies for development. To be developmental a change has to improve something over the previous state of affairs or, negatively, to regress from the previous state to qualify as a regression. Thus, the idea of progression (be it regression or progress) is necessarily associated with the concept of development. The trouble with this view of development is that it confuses progress with recency, since the passage of time is the only factor of development. Hence, the later the better. This mechanical approach presents an epistemologically dangerous consequence for empiricism. If progress is due to the work of the clock, then the end of history, or the end of the world or even the end of evolution will happen in a world close to perfection, if not already perfect. The ultimate hour will be the accomplishment of a mechanical form of eschatology: in a way, a secularized version of the second coming of Christ for the last judgment. Perfection and time are one.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Norms in Human Development , pp. 35 - 56Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006