Now that we've established a theoretical and methodological grounding, let's get back to Telecorp. In Chapter 2, I invoked Machiavelli to discuss how Telecorp's workers were nearly all “massed at the border,” nearly all in constant communication with people external to Telecorp as well as with those inside the company. Machiavelli is an apt figure to invoke here, not in terms of war but in terms of strategy – for Telecorp had to lay out a strategy for growth and expansion, and that strategy had to take into account market, regulatory, legislative, and technological conditions. These conditions were like historical accretions forming hills and mountains around which Telecorp had to negotiate. Telecorp's structure, in which its employees were nearly all “massed at the border,” was a direct result of its negotiations over this terrain.

To understand how Telecorp acquired this strategic posture – which is to say, its shape at the level of cultural–historical activity – we have to examine the history of the telecommunications industry. But as we saw in Chap-ter 3, activity theory and actor–network theory disagree on what constitutes history and how to examine it. Activity theory sees history as developmental and linear and examines it through examining the contradictions that form in activities. Actor–network theory sees history as settlements that accrete and sediment and examines it through translations. Each provides insights for us that are potentially valuable. So let's apply them both to the case before us.