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4 - Strategies of transnationalism: the ECA and the politics of peace and productivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2009

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Summary

In the second half of 1948, the European scene was almost as foreboding as it had been when Marshall announced the recovery program a year earlier. The Berlin crisis, the Communist disruptions and labor unrest, the German economic revival, and the morass of nonconvertible currencies, trade restrictions, and low productivity were serious problems that required concerted action if Western Europe was going to look forward to a new day of peace and prosperity. Amid all of these difficulties, many turned again to the idea of unification as a way to control the Germans, contain the Soviets, and revive the European economies. Some looked to military unification through the Brussels Pact and a North Atlantic defense community. Others pointed to the OEEC as a hopeful sign of economic integration. Still others wanted to bring the new forms of economic and military collaboration under the aegis of a European political federation. Whatever their differences, all shared a vision of redemption through unification. Through greater unity, they saw Western Europe emerging from the rubble and the ruin of war, arising, like Lazarus from the grave, with new life and vitality.

American leaders did what they could to encourage this hope. The Republican Party platform of 1948 urged “sturdy progress toward unity in western Europe.” Republican luminaries like Dulles and Dewey called again for “European unity.” The Democrats issued a similar proclamation and the State Department announced its strong support for “the progressively closer integration of western Europe.”

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The Marshall Plan
America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952
, pp. 135 - 188
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1987

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