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Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2012

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Summary

Lloyd George emerged from the war with his prestige at an all-time high. All the political crises he had provoked through his inept deviousness were forgotten. He was hailed as the “man who won the war” (not the least by himself), a characterization that was patently untrue. For one thing, the war was not won by Britain alone but by a coalition of powers. For another, there were factors that probably weighed more than Lloyd George's leadership in the final victory: the strangling naval blockade that hastened Germany's capitulation; Kitchener, who built a formidable army, which became the mainstay of the Entente after the spring of 1917; American help; and Haig, who learned from past defeats, and adopted a formula in 1918 that would produce a string of brilliant victories.

Still, there are many modern day historians who consider that Lloyd George was the indispensable man in the First World War, just like Churchill would be in the second. They argue that he brought talented men into government, cut through red tape to achieve his objective and conciliated the workers, and that he could withstand relentless pressure, maintain his composure in the face of adversity and possessed dogged determination, a fertile imagination, boundless energy and the ability to inspire those with whom he came into contact. In other words, there was no one else on the political scene better suited to cope with the myriad and complex problems stemming from the worldwide conflict.

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Publisher: Anthem Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • Conclusion
  • George Cassar
  • Book: Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918
  • Online publication: 05 March 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9781843318156.023
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  • Conclusion
  • George Cassar
  • Book: Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918
  • Online publication: 05 March 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9781843318156.023
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • George Cassar
  • Book: Lloyd George at War, 1916–1918
  • Online publication: 05 March 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9781843318156.023
Available formats
×