Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 States, Firms, and the Enforcement of International Law
- 3 Lessons from Contract Theory
- 4 A Model of Optimal Enforcement
- 5 Patterns of International Law Enforcement
- 6 The Choice between Formal and Informal Enforcement
- 7 The Future of International Law and Its Enforcement
- Glossary
- Table of Authorities
- Index
2 - States, Firms, and the Enforcement of International Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- 1 Introduction
- 2 States, Firms, and the Enforcement of International Law
- 3 Lessons from Contract Theory
- 4 A Model of Optimal Enforcement
- 5 Patterns of International Law Enforcement
- 6 The Choice between Formal and Informal Enforcement
- 7 The Future of International Law and Its Enforcement
- Glossary
- Table of Authorities
- Index
Summary
Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 47 (2nd ed. 1979)Why do people invest in the enforcement of international law? This question lies at the heart of this study. Our answer, in a nutshell, is that people will make investments that increase the likelihood that actors will cooperate in a collective project – the joint production of social welfare. Absent these investments, actors would not meet their obligations and social welfare would suffer. The greater likelihood of valuable cooperation provides the principal incentive for states to absorb the cost of enforcement.
This claim rests on several premises, which we discuss in the coming pages. We argue that decisions about enforcement are bound up with choices about the voluntary creation of international law obligations. It follows that the process by which international law is made is, for our purposes, akin to the process by which people make binding commitments by forming contracts. We anticipate many objections to each of these premises and attempt to meet them. Understanding the thread of our argument requires an appreciation both of how international law creation works and the state of the debate among political scientists, international lawyers, and other academics about what explains international relations.
We also elaborate on what we mean when we say that “people” make international law. The traditional conception of international law depicts states as the makers.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Limits of LeviathanContract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law, pp. 29 - 58Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2006