During the war years the fears of the governments-in-exile had been focused on the transition, the chaotic period between the German withdrawal and the re-establishment of public order, the probably protracted period of liberation struggles when irregularities could occur and subversive forces might be tempted to seize local power. During this period, the military command would take control of the situation and share administrative responsibility with the exile governments according to ‘Civil Affairs Agreements’. Conservative resistance movements of career soldiers like the Armée Secrète in Belgium and the Ordedienst (OD) in the Netherlands had also prepared for this period, wanting to impose their own authoritarian conception of law and order, which could only increase the apprehension of the governments-in-exile. The Belgian government was spared the realisation of its worst fears by the hazards of military strategy: the invasion forces had been contained in the Normandy bottleneck from 6 June 1944 until early August, but once the German defence was broken on the Normandy front the Allies rushed forward to the next barrier, formed in the north by the great rivers in the Netherlands, which they reached in less than two months’ time. The airborne landing at Arnhem on 17 September 1944 hit a strong SS tank division and ended in costly defeat for the Allies. The offensive had to be postponed until the next spring and the logistics problem forced the Canadian troops to clear the Scheldt estuary downstream from German resistance in a slow and costly operation.