The gap between formalist structure definition and neural dynamic

Acknowledged mental knowledge theories and neuronal brain analysis should not remain separated. The challenge is particularly addressed to linguistics as a mental study both in the abstract form of formal linguistics and in formats of “Grammar as life”. In the present research situations we cannot do more than propose and study models that seem to be plausible for bringing structures and organizations of the linguistic mind and the neurocognitive brain into correspondences. Even this is a difficult task, in particular when we want to correlate techniques of passive formal symbolic structure representations and central processing combination with systematic descriptions of connection-based and radically dynamic organization in cognitive neuroscience! This was already explained in earlier chapters: In principled biological perspective there are only self-organizing units in cognitive neuroscience in Aristotle’s, Spinoza’s and Leibniz’ philosophy, today scientifically systematized by Fuster and Damasio.

We must expect that perspective correspondence is more difficult to model than the similar task of relating software and hardware processes in computer science. The “software” and “data structures” that appropriately constitute the functional mind must be far more tightly bound up with the biological nature of the neuronal networks. This certainly holds for the relation between mental linguistic structure and neuronal brain structure-based organization.