Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-768ffcd9cc-9th95 Total loading time: 0.412 Render date: 2022-12-01T18:11:02.361Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "displayNetworkTab": true, "displayNetworkMapGraph": false, "useSa": true } hasContentIssue true

Chapter 7 - Distinguishing between Rightful Claims and Groundless Pretensions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2020

Sofie Møller
Affiliation:
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
Get access

Summary

This chapter considers the presentation of reason as judge and its ability to distinguish between rightful claims and groundless pretensions. As background for this parallel, Møller considers the eighteenth-century debate on the problem of outdated laws. As a solution to this problem, two positions on judicial discretion emerged: the discretionary position, in which judges should be given greater discretion, and the positivist position, which promotes legal reform. Møller then shows that the metaphor of reason as judge should be read in consideration of the background of the debate on legal reform: at the beginning of the Critique, reason is a judge who is dissatisfied with the laws proposed by metaphysicians, but through the work these are revised and made to accord with reason’s own principles, thus making it legitimate to make judgements in accordance with the approved laws. This account of epistemic authority should be understood in connection with the formulation of cognition as judging, which makes the central question of epistemology one of legitimacy, proving which judgements thinkers can legitimately make.

Type
Chapter
Information
Kant's Tribunal of Reason
Legal Metaphor and Normativity in the <I>Critique of Pure Reason</I>
, pp. 113 - 128
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×