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1 - The good will, moral worth, and duty: concerns about Kant's rationalist moral psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2010

Anne Margaret Baxley
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
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Summary

Kant's views about moral and non-moral motivation in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason have been the basis for some of the most familiar criticisms of Kant's rationalism. On the basis of these texts, historical and contemporary critics of Kant's ethics have objected to his rigid moral psychology, which appears to ground moral duty in a thin conception of rational agency, making moral activity a matter of rational conscience, rather than a matter of character, virtue, emotion, and desire. Given their role within the foundations of Kant's moral theory, these views about the good will, moral worth, and duty will be important components in any attempt to reconstruct a complete Kantian account of virtue. In addition to motivating and structuring an examination of Kant's later and less familiar texts, which articulate a theory of virtue that accords moral value to a range of feelings, desires, and dispositions connected with sensibility, these doctrines may also constrain the details of Kant's moral psychology as elaborated in his theory of virtue, at least on an interpretation that seeks to preserve consistency across Kant's texts. After looking at the details of Kant's account of the good will and his well-known examples of acting from duty in Groundwork I, we consider four distinct worries about Kant's rationalist moral psychology.

Type
Chapter
Information
Kant's Theory of Virtue
The Value of Autocracy
, pp. 7 - 47
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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