To this point, we have reconstructed the portion of Hobbes's compositive argument presented in Part 2 of Leviathan. There Hobbes attempts to identify a principle of political obligation that could, if generally followed, ensure the perpetual maintenance of effective social order. That principle is that one is to obey one's extant effective political authority in all of its commands not repugnant to one's duty to God. Hobbes then offers arguments both from narrow prudence and from morality for subjects to adhere to that principle.

But recall that Hobbes is engaged in the project of providing everyone with a sufficient reason to adhere to a principle which could, if generally followed, ensure the perpetual maintenance of effective social order. This requires, in part, that he provide people with reasons for adhering to his principle linked to the satisfaction of all of their most important interests; and also that he so specify his principle that it can be shown actually to be one that, if generally followed, could ensure perpetual domestic stability. To this point in the argument, Hobbes has not dealt with one crucially important set of interests – religious interests; there has as yet been no argument that people have any religious reason for affirming Hobbes's principle of political obligation.