It is an honor to have this opportunity to pay tribute to such a widely respected scholar. Nancy Schwartz was an excellent theorist. She wrote papers that developed models of real world phenomena. Thus it is fitting that I draw on my experience in social insurance as both a theorist and a policy analyst to discuss a topic where theory has been important in informing policy discussion and policy discussions have shaped issues for theoretical analysis. I will use the provision of retirement income as the social insurance issue to be discussed.

Two analytical characteristics particularly distinguish the writings of economists. One is the primary focus on the self as motivation for behavior, with the use of utility maximizing models as the analytical device for modeling this focus. The second is the use of equilibrium constructs to determine the outcomes that follow from individual choices. Analysts of social insurance generally recognize that a critical part of the case for having social insurance is the failure of individuals to adequately look ahead and provide for their own retirements. Thus social insurance analysis is one place where the rationality assumptions of economists are not given as full a reign as in most other areas of economic analysis.