Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-sh8wx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-22T16:01:10.474Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

16 - Plotinus,Lockeand Humeon the unity of individual substances

from Part III - Arguments for mental substance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2016

Howard Robinson
Affiliation:
Central European University, Budapest
Get access

Summary

The final chapter draws together some of the themes in Parts II and III. Locke, with his notion of ‘the same life’ and ‘the same consciousness’, which seems to be more than the mere succession of causally connected things, represents an almost Aristotelian organic account of the unity of substances. Both Hume and Plotinus thought that unity would have to be something more than this, but the latter believed in it and the former did not. Nevertheless, Plotinus did not think that physical objects were true unities, but that it was a projection of the unity that belonged to the self. This shares important features with Hume’s conventionalism, except that Hume did not believe in the unity of the self was there to be projected – substantial unity is, for him, pure convention or fiction. With the conclusions drawn in Part III we can see that the Plotinian view fits the facts.
Type
Chapter
Information
From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance
Resurrecting the Mind
, pp. 248 - 259
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×