Having sought to differentiate Spencer's position as an evolutionist from Darwin's, we may now return to our more proper theme, by asking what doctrine or doctrines of human welfare Mr. Spencer furnishes.

We note three main positions, independent of each other. First, human conduct is good or wise in proportion as it is more evolved; secondly, in proportion as it draws near the ideal goal of ethical progress, the perfect balance between egoistic and altruistic impulses ; thirdly, in proportion as it is faithful to the high attainments of modern social advance with its ideal of a still higher future, when the compulsory co-operation distinctive of militarism shall have entirely given place to the free co-operation distinctive of industrialism.

The first of these positions is not specially formulated or emphasised by Spencer, but represents an assumption that runs through much of his system, and that works to the surface at many isolated points. Good conduct is more evolved than bad conduct, and, being more evolved, it is more complex. The bad man is like a clumsy juggler who can barely keep in motion two balls at once; the good man is like a clever juggler who, without sign of effort, can control his half-dozen balls or more. With this is associated the conception of evil and in particular of crime, as atavism.