In 1885, Britain was in an exposed international position, isolated in Europe and challenged along the periphery of the Empire. The Penjdeh stand-off with Russia in the spring of that year and the Sudan imbroglio underlined the decline in British power. At home, the Gladstonian transformation of the Liberal party had accelerated the ‘exodus of the Whigs’ amongst the diplomats. The fall of the Liberal administration also marked a turning-point in Britain’s external affairs. With it began Lord Salisbury’s long ascendancy over foreign policy. It was also a landmark in the development of the ‘Foreign Office mind’. During this period official thinking came to embrace relations with Bismarckian Germany as the central relationship in British foreign policy. Calculations of British strategic interests and diplomatic efforts to contain Russia in the East and France in Egypt and elsewhere in Africa and South East Asia revolved around this Anglo-German axis. Parallel to this political reorientation, personnel changes altered the internal dynamics within the high-Victorian diplomatic service.

After ‘the Montagues & Capulets’: the high-Victorians

The collapse of the Gladstone administration in June 1885 and the arrival of ‘our new masters’ were broadly welcomed by senior diplomats. This was especially so in light of Salisbury’s return to the Foreign Office. The Marquis, as Philip Currie enthused, was ‘now well in harness and shows all his former power and grasp in dealing with affairs. What a contrast to poor pottering old G[ranville] who, if by chance he ever made up his mind, changed it again before twelve hours were over.’ No doubt, Salisbury’s past and anticipated future patronage of his Conservative-leaning former private secretary influenced Currie’s thinking. Loathing for the renegade Tory Gladstone had always been strong among some diplomats. Still, the vilification in private correspondence of the ‘slippery old cuss’ and ‘the Antichrist himself’ reached new levels.