Studies on Ethiopian history have tended to overemphasize the prominent state structure and the place of the monarchs in defence, administration, and legislative and judicial systems. There is much more to the state and society, however, than the leaders, who may have seemed to be feudal warmongers, and their governments, which may have appeared inefficient. Closer scrutiny suggests that such images have been misleading. I contend that European travellers, journalists, military historians and other writers responsible for representing the defence system, the subject of this work, have glossed over the chewa troops’ sense of responsibility. Sometimes referring to them as ‘a horde’ or as neftegna (literally ‘gunmen’) – a supposedly pointless group of killers and tools of oppression, these writers have played down the chewa contribution, even to Ethiopia's struggles against Italian invasions in 1896 and 1935–41. The compulsion felt by many authors to reflect international support for the second Italian invasion has led them to single out 1935–36 as evidence supporting Mussolini's claim to have occupied Ethiopia, irrespective of the efforts of the Ethiopian guerrilla warriors who started fighting as soon as the emperor departed (‘fled’ according to some), and continued to restrict the Italians to the main roads and to some cities, towns and forts. Such an approach ignores the prominent chewa term yetelat werera zemen, ‘era of enemy invasion’, describing the years 1935–41. No mere choice of words, this expressed a deep sense of the warriors’ responsibility for defining and defending Ethiopia's territorial integrity, administrative structure and sovereignty. Colonialism was inconceivable to the socially rooted rural warriors, who thought of themselves and their activities as serving their country and society.

This book explores the historical and social roots of such local views, but first a few words are needed to highlight the international context of twentieth-century Ethiopia. The claim that colonial rule in Ethiopia was a fait accompli, give or take a few localized groups of troublemakers, presented Ethiopia as a victim and enhanced Italy's self-perception as a victor which won battles in short order. Underestimating Ethiopian guerrilla activities covered up Fascist atrocities, notably the use of aerial bombing, mustard gas, intimidation and planned annihilation of the population.