Terrorism is probably the tactic most closely associated with guerrilla warfare. Drawn from images of Al Qaeda attacks in New York, London, and Madrid or horrific bombings in cafes and bus stations by Palestinians, the predominance of terrorism among guerrillas seems a foregone conclusion. But this conclusion is wrong. While public perceptions are shaped by radical Islamic and Palestinian terrorism, many other insurgent groups either disavow terrorism entirely or use it sparingly and in conjunction with military tactics, economic warfare, and public diplomacy.

It is notable that two of the most successful liberation movements of recent years, those in East Timor and Eritrea, repudiated terrorism entirely, preferring military strikes, public diplomacy, and, in East Timor, nonviolent resistance (Kilcullen 2009:206–210; Weldemichael 2013:3, 13–15). In the Western Sahara, the Islamic Polisario also rejected terrorism (Stephan and Mundy 2006). Among groups that turned to terrorism, some either gave it up in favor of other tactics or, when attacking civilians, usually pursued collaborators and informers. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), no less reputed for blood thirsty terrorist attacks than the Palestinians, abandoned terrorism half way through its campaign after realizing that killing civilians only brought them the wrath of the local and international community. By 1989, top Republican officials were already reporting “a greater realization than ever of the need for the PIRA to avoid civilian casualties” (English 2003:260). Instead, the PIRA redoubled its political efforts while restricting bombings to transportation hubs and emptied buildings in business districts (Rogers 2000:13). In Kosovo, too, guerrillas assassinated Albanian informers and Serbian officials but the LDK, the political wing of Kosovo’s national movement, never advocated terrorism (Bekaj 2010; Clark 2000:142; Özerdem 2003).