East Timor’s struggle against Indonesia was asymmetric in every way possible. Materially, the sides were wildly mismatched. The FALANTIL guerrillas of East Timor fielded small arms while Indonesia bought sophisticated armaments from the West (Klare 1992/1993). Legally, Indonesia twice flouted international resolutions to block independence for East Timor: first in 1975, as Portugal decolonized, and second in 1999, as the UN shepherded East Timor toward statehood. Morally, Indonesia undertook indiscriminate bombing, torture, assassination, and a brutal scorched-earth policy that left the infrastructure devastated, thousands killed, and 60 percent of the population displaced by 1999 (Dunn 2001; Kilcullen 2009:206–208; UNICEF 1999). For many years, East Timorese leaders, whose widespread authority turned on charismatic and traditional leadership backed by the steady evolution of formal elections and ad hoc consultation (Niner 2007), had few options other than an armed struggle.

While it is always difficult to establish just cause and legitimate authority unambiguously, the justice of East Timor’s struggle should be relatively uncontroversial. Just cause remedies human rights violations and enforces internationally recognized legal claims. Last resort and the prospect of reasonable success confirm the right to fight. Legitimate authority afforded competent and respected leadership. Having satisfied these conditions, how may a guerrilla movement, like that of East Timor, wage an armed struggle?