Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Equality, Luck, and Responsibility
- 2 Corrective Justice and Spontaneous Order
- 3 A Fair Division of Risks
- 4 Foresight and Responsibility
- 5 Punishment and the Tort/Crime Distinction
- 6 Mistakes
- 7 Recklessness and Attempts
- 8 Beyond Corrective and Retributive Justice? Marx and Pashukanis on the “Narrow Horizons of Bourgeois Right”
- 9 Reciprocity and Responsibility in Distributive Justice
- Index
9 - Reciprocity and Responsibility in Distributive Justice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Equality, Luck, and Responsibility
- 2 Corrective Justice and Spontaneous Order
- 3 A Fair Division of Risks
- 4 Foresight and Responsibility
- 5 Punishment and the Tort/Crime Distinction
- 6 Mistakes
- 7 Recklessness and Attempts
- 8 Beyond Corrective and Retributive Justice? Marx and Pashukanis on the “Narrow Horizons of Bourgeois Right”
- 9 Reciprocity and Responsibility in Distributive Justice
- Index
Summary
Most of this book has examined the ways in which the effects of wrongful acts must be undone in order to uphold fair terms of interaction. Tort law is concerned with undoing wrongful losses; the criminal law is concerned with vindicating fair terms of interaction. This concluding chapter examines the ways in which the same conception of justice applies to the other ways in which luck can shape a person's prospects. Sometimes, a person's life is shaped in advance by standing misfortunes of ability and situation. Other times they are shaped by risks a person ought to have recognized. Most often they lie somewhere in between, and are shaped by unanticipated consequences of prospectively sensible choices. If holdings are to be justified by the ways in which they came about, at least some of the time, the background effects of luck must also be controlled.
The relationship between distributive justice and responsibility is important for two reasons, one conceptual, the other political. Conceptually, the idea of a fair division of risks requires an account of the background risks that are largely independent of interaction. If terms of interaction are to be fair, some of those risks should not be borne by anyone in particular. Instead, they should be held in common, by the community as a whole. Otherwise, the effects of those risks will unfairly infect subsequent holdings.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Equality, Responsibility, and the Law , pp. 264 - 296Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998