Introduction

Egypt ranked thirty-first in the global Failed States Index of 2012, climbing fourteen places compared to the previous year, which prompted journalists and commentators to question the legitimacy of the State (Howeidy 2013). A failed state, in political terms, is characterised by endogenous problems as well as the collapse of its legal and political systems, the structure that guarantees a certain degree of order; externally, a failed state will have no single body representing it at international level (Bush 2004), and sociologically, its core government will have collapsed. The government referred to here is one that monopolises power, thus, the police service as well as the judiciary would be incapable of maintaining law and order, and hence allow violence to prevail. Such a state is ineffective in that it fails to fulfil its function of government and, practically, it becomes an illegitimate state. A legitimate government, in contrast, is one which is accountable to its citizens and successfully ensures citizens’ compliance without having to resort to violence; if state strength is measured by the ability of a state to propose and implement major societal changes then Egypt cannot be classified as a strong state. Although it has a united presence at international level, Egypt's considerable internal problems jeopardise its functionality as well as its legitimacy.

It is important, therefore, to revisit the political scene before and after 2011, in order to understand the weaknesses of the Egyptian State in view of the recent uprisings. The political opposition was largely disorganised during Mubarak's era, thanks to the dominance of the wealthy elites and their complex control of the domestic scene. One of the most striking facts about Egypt was the huge gap between the elites and the rest of the population; while a tiny fraction of the population lived in guarded communities with luxurious amenities such as swimming pools, sports courts, private schools and private green spaces, half of the population was deprived of basic state services and survived on less than USD 2 a day. Added to this were the regime's fraudulent national election in 2010 and the numerous acts of police violence against lower- and middle-class youth.