The previous chapters suggest that cooperation between MS in foreign policy is, as expected, affected by a combination of domestic political processes and economic interest. While the influence of economic and strategic interests proved easier to measure, accounting for the influence of domestic politics was more complex than anticipated. It is hard to capture the way that domestic forces shape EU foreign policy in a single overarching account, even if their influence was apparent in the two cases. That being said, the results of the study provide evidence to challenge the Almond-Lippmann thesis, in line with what has also been found by Hosti (1992; 2004) and others when studying US foreign policy. Furthermore, the empirical chapters also shed some light on the democratic credentials of EU foreign policy, since executives seem to be keenly aware of trends in public opinion and are strongly influenced by political parties and veto players. The results also help our understanding of EU foreign policy when compared to other policy areas in the EU, and in comparison with other political systems (such as the US, the country from which the Almond-Lippmann thesis originates).

In sum, while falling short of an overarching theory, the results of this study offer some insights into the influence of domestic factors in European foreign policy which might be useful in understanding its past, present, and future development. The influence of domestic factors seems crucial in areas in which cooperation between MS is necessary for them to function. This goes beyond foreign policy; the crisis surrounding the single currency is a recent and notable example of this. In foreign policy, institutional reforms such as the creation of the post of a High Representative and the setting up of a European External Action Service will achieve little if MS fail to collaborate more closely.

European foreign policy and the Almond-Lippmann consensus: do domestic politics matter?

The starting point for this book was to assess the relevance of the Almond-Lippmann consensus (which assumes that foreign policy is isolated from domestic political processes, and particularly from public opinion) to the European case. As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, the three main assumptions of this consensus are: the volatility of public opinion, a lack of structure in public attitudes, and the limited impact of the latter on foreign policy.