SINCE THE EARLY 1990s the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR) has generated controversy in discussions of regulatory theory and policy. Much of that controversy has resulted from criticism lodged against the ECPR to the effect that the rule is not general in its applicability or not efficient in some respect. The criticism reached a crescendo in 1996, when in the First Report and Order the FCC mischaracterized the ECPR and then forbade the states to use the rule that the agency mislabeled as the ECPR. As we note chapter 9, we call our rule the M-ECPR to avoid further mislabeling. This chapter addresses the criticisms of M-ECPR pricing raised by economists who have testified on behalf of entrants advocating lower prices for resale and unbundled network elements. We show that those critics of M-ECPR pricing do not appreciate that the rule is efficient and compensatory. We then respond to a controversy at the cutting edge of the state and federal efforts to implement the pricing provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: the claim that the principal authors of the efficient component-pricing rule, William J. Baumol and Robert D. Willig, rejected the M-ECPR in favor of TELRIC (total element long-run incremental cost) pricing for unbundled network elements.